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2. 1 Labor Market Participation Model o . 16
I. INTRODUCTION
The inception of the AVF in 1972 was a watershed in US
Defense policy. Since then the cost of meeting manpower and
strength requirements has remained at the forefront of the
Defense debate. To maintain readiness in the face of budget
restrictions the Administration has been pursuing a policy
of increasing Reserve manning whilst maintaining a cap on
Active force end strengths. This is based on the assumption
that Reserve forces are less expensive than Active forces to
maintain because reservists are paid only for the time they
actually spend at drills. The contribution that Reserve
forces make to overall readiness has been increasing
steadily since the inception of the AVF for two major
reasons. First, escalating personnel costs have forced
planners to limit the size of Active forces. Second, the
removal of the draft has diminished the capability of the
Active force to quickly expand and mobilize. Currently, any
significant mobilization would require Reserve augmentation
of Active forces almost immediately. [ Brinkerhoff and
Grissmer, 1984: p. 8] .
To meet this expanding role Reserve forces are organized
into three categories; the Ready Reserve, the Standby
Reserve and the Retired Reserve. The Ready Reserve is the
8
primary contributor to readiness and it is composed of the
Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The
IRR consists of individuals who train irregularly and whose
role is augmentation of existing units during mobilization.
The Selected Reserve is the most significant component of
the Reserve force and it consists of units which are
organized and equipped to perform specific missions; trained
personnel who augment Active units; and individuals in
training pipelines. Members of the Selected Reserve are
required to attend weekend drills regularly throughout the
year and at least one period of active duty training
annually. This thesis focuses on the Selected Reserve.
The impact of recent Defense manpower policy has been
that while Active force levels have remained constant over
the last decade. Selected Reserve end strengths have risen
from 788,000 in 1978 to 1,100,652 in September 1985.
[Defense Manpower Data Center, 1985: p. 1] . A breakdown of
current Selected Reserve strength by components is shown in
Table 1. All components are projecting future increases in
end strengths for Selected Reserve forces. For example, the
Army manpower plan submitted in the February 1985 budget
projected an increase of 116,000 members of the Army
Selected Reserve (United States Army Reserve and Army
Reserve National Guard) by 1990. This represents an increase
of 16 percent of current end strength over five years.




Army Reserve National Guard 439,952
United States Army Reserve 292,080
United States Navy Reserve 129,832
United States Marine Corps Reserve .. 41,586
Air National Guard 109,398
United States Air Force Reserve 75,214
DoD Total 1 , 008 , 062
United States Coast Guard Reserve ... 12,590
Total ' 1,100,652
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Official Guard and
Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics , September 1985.
Meeting these expansion requirements efficiently will
depend upon a sound understanding of the impact of factors
which affect Reserve force supply levels. At present that
type of information is not available. A recent Rand
Corporation review of the Reserve concluded:
Forecasting Reserve accession levels is beset with a
great deal of uncertainty until ongoing research is able
to sort out the various factors affecting enlistments
and make some determination regarding their possible
magnitude and direction of effect. [ Brinkerhoff and
Grissmer, 1984: p. 29]
.
A further indicator of the paucity of projection
information available was the reliance by a recent
Congressional Budget Office study of Army Reserve manpower
on a supply model estimated in 1981 by William McNaught of
the Rand Corporation. [Congressional Budget Office, 1985:
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p. 59] . As well as being dated , the policy parameters
estimated by that model are of questionable validity, as is
shown later in this thesis.
A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THIS THESIS
The purpose of this thesis is to develop an econometric
supply model for the Reserve forces. Because the Reserves
recruit and operate in local labor markets, the primary
focus will be an attempt to identify and quantify those
local labor market factors which are most important for
Reserve supply. This emphasis on geographic disaggregation
is necessary because while Active force recruits leave the
local market, reservists generally maintain their primary
employment in the local labor market. The disparity in
local labor market conditions across the country must then
be taken into account if the Reserve forces are to
efficiently meet their manpower goals.
An econometric model of this type can assist policy
formulation in the following areas:
• allocation of new authorizations,
• location of new units,
• assessment of the long term viability of existing
units,
• allocation of recruiting resources.
The thesis will distinguish between non prior service
(NPS) and prior service (PS) accessions to the Reserve when
11
estimating the models developed for two reasons. Stagnant
Active force end strengths and increasing retention implies
that the pool of potential PS reservists will be shrinking.
[ Brinkerhoff and Grissmer^ 1984: p. 29] . Also NPS and PS
recruits are probably influenced differently by local
economic conditions and incentives. The distinction between
the two categories is important. In FY 85, 63 percent of DoD
reserve accessions were PS personnel. [Defense Manpower Data
Center, 1985: p. 178] . However the shrinking PS pool implies
that the projected Reserve manpower expansion will have to
be fuelled primarily by NPS accessions.
Models developed in this thesis will only be estimated
for Army Selected Reserve data. This is because Army
components represent 67 percent of current Selected Reserve
manpower (see Table 1) and Army units are the best examples
of units which are forced to survive within the confines of
their local labor market. Air Force and Navy Reserve units
have more flexibility in recruiting for and manning units
from outside their local areas.
B. A PROFILE OF TODAY'S RESERVE
When considering the impact of economic policy tools it
is important to have an appreciation for the underlying
population that is being targeted. Table 2 provides a force














% AVG AVG %
FEM AGE YOS HSG
5 30 8 57
17 29 7 50
11 31 9 64
4 24 4 73
12 34 11 79
18 33 10 76
10 - - -
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Official Guard and
Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics . September 1985.
Table 3 displays a profile of Reserve recruits in FY 85
by components.
TABLE 3































Note: Defense Manpower Data Center defines prior service as
any amount of previous service in a uniformed federal
service, including previous service in any reserve
component.
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Official Guard and
Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics . September 1985.
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C. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
In Chapter II the economic theory which describes the
motivation of participation in the Reserve is discussed and
previous studies of both Active and Reserve manpower supply
are reviewed. A theoretical Reserve supply model is
developed.
Chapter III describes the data base and methodology used
to estimate the econometric supply model. Chapter IV reports
the parameter estimates and elasticities obtained from the
model. The policy implications of the estimates are
discussed. In Chapter V the results of the study are
reviewed and suggestions are made regarding potentially *
fruitful areas for further research.
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II. ECONOMIC THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
A. THE DECISION TO MOONLIGHT
1. The Economic Model
"Moonlighting" is a term used to describe
undertaking a second job in addition to holding a primary
full or part time job. Shishko and Rostker have attempted to
model moonlighting behavior using an extension of the
standard work/leisure choice model of labor force
participation. [ Shishko and Rostker: 1976] . The model is
depicted in Figure 2. 1.
The model characterizes the choice to work as a
tradeoff between the individual's desire for income (from
work) and leisure time. In Figure 2. 1 hours of work or
leisure are on the horizontal axis and the vertical axis
measures income. The indifference curves U" , U' and U" each
depict a locus of leisure/income combinations between which
the individual is indifferent. Overall utility increases as
the indifference curve shifts away from the origin. The
slope of W" measures the wage rate in the individual's
primary job. To maximize his utility the individual will
seek the point where his primary wage rate exactly equals
the slope of the highest attainable indifference curve. This






Figure 2. 1 Labor Market Participation Model
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week. In the primary labor market however, most individuals
are limited by employers to 40 work hours, depicted in the
model by point B. Thus point A is unattainable. This
individual will then be motivated to seek a second job to
increase his utility. If he can secure a job that pays wage
W' for example he will wish to move to point C. By working
an additional 10 hours on the second job he improves his
utility to U*. This model suggests a number of factors that
affect the decision to moonlight.
Second lob wage . If the individual is at point B
the minimum wage which will induce him to take a second job
is equal to the slope of U" at point B. This is the
moonlighting reservation wage. As the secondary wage
increases above this the moonlight hours desired will
increase. If the wage continues to rise however an income
effect may start to restrict the number of hours desired on
the second job. Coupled with this is a consideration of
costs associated with the second job, for example transport
costs. These costs increase the moonlighting reservation
wage and decrease the probability that the individual will
choose to moonlight. [ Borack et al,1985: p. 16]. Conversely
non-wage benefits accruing on the moonlighting job will have
the opposite effect.
Primary wage . The effect of a change in the primary
wage rate on the moonlighting decision is ambiguous. An
17
increase in the wage can increase or decrease the moonlight
reservation wage and the number of moonlight hours desired.
[Shishko and Rostker, 1976: p. 299]
.
Primary job hours . A change in primary job hours
can have differing effects on moonlighting decisions
depending on the relationship between the primary and
secondary wage rates. Generally an increase in primary job
hours worked will decrease the probability that an
individual will moonlight, or the number of moonlighting
hours desired.
Secondary lob hours . Restrictions on the number of
hours available on the second job are just as likely to
occur as primary job hour restrictions. The Reserves are a
good case in point because members are contractually obliged
to work fixed hours monthly and attend a period of full time
training once a year. The impact of these restrictions may
vary but it can be characterised by the model. Consider an
individual at point B faced with a moonlight job alternative
which pays W' but requires that he work a fixed 15 hours.
This combination (point D) will not improve his utility (he
remains on U" ) and so he is unlikely to accept the second
job offer.
Non labor income . The effect of non labor income in
the model is to raise W" vertically by the amount of income.
Again the effect on the moonlighting decision is ambiguous
18
because it depends on the slope of the individual's
indifference curves and the primary and secondary wage
rates. Under most circumstances, increases in non labor
income will decrease the probability of an individual
monnlighting or the number of moonlighting hours desired.
Spouse's income could be considered under this factor but
its effect is more complex. As well as raising the wage
rate curve, a change in spouse's income also alters the
shape of the indifference curves. As his spouse's work hours
and income vary, an individual's valuation of his own
leisure time will change because of the fluctuation in total
household income and the tradeoffs made between spouses
concerning household responsibilities.
These implications of the model have been borne out
by research. Citing a number of other studies of
moonlighting behavior William McNaught [ 1981] identified the
following characteristics of moonlighters relative to single
job holders:
• they earn smaller primary incomes,
• they work fewer hours on their primary job,
• they receive little non labor income,
• they incur greater household expenditures,
• they have larger families,
• they have more education,
• they are younger.
[McNaught, July 1981: p. 10]
.
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2. The Special Case of Reserve Participation
The model above is general and considers primarily
economic motivations. There are a number of aspects of
Reserve participation which distinguishes it from the
civilian moonlighting decision.
First, the work schedule in the Reserve is
inflexible. Reservists are committed to attend two days of
drills per month and a two week active duty training period
each summer. At any given Reserve wage this acts as a
constraint on utility as shown in the model. Consequently,
it restricts the potential supply of reservists.
Second, upon enlistment reservists are required to
attend a period of full time initial training. Currently
this is either twelve "Weeks or two periods of eight weeks.
[Army Regulation 140-1,1983: p. 22]. This may clash with the
individual's primary job committments and preclude some
potential reservists from enlisting. This full time training
committment also may impact in other ways. It may be used by
some to sample active duty military life before they commit
themselves to an active duty enlistment. Also it may be
attractive to unemployed people who may consider it as a
legitimate job opportunity. Individuals in these categories
serve to increase Reserve supply levels.
Third, an individual joining the Reserve enters an
employment contract. This normally commits him to six years
20
of Reserve service and the possibility of being called to
active duty in time of mobilization or civil emergency. It
also legally subjects him to military discipline. This
obligation probably dissuades some potential moonlighters
from joining the Reserve and increases the relative
attractiveness of civilian secondary job alternatives.
Fourth, there are a number of pecuniary benefits
which accrue to reservists, which are not usually available
in civilian moonlighting jobs. These include PX/commissary
privileges, medical care and some retirement benefits at age
60. These all have some positive effect on Reserve supply.
There are also some non economic characteristics of
Reserve participation which may prove attractive to
individuals. The Reserve offers membership of a highly
identifiable group. It offers esprit de corps, social
contact and possible access to unique and potentially
rewarding skills training. In this sense the Reserve could
be likened to organizations such as volunteer fire
departments and adventure clubs. The studies discussed
below have borne out the importance of these types of
benefits to reservists.
One Rand study on Reserve reenlistment found that
reservists value these non pecuniary aspects of their jobs
more highly than do their civilian moonlighting counterparts
[Grissmer and Kirby, 1985: p. 22]. In a two year study of the
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Army National Guard, Lowndes Stephens [ 1977] found that
while economic incentives were of prime importance in
recruiting and retaining reservists, considerations such as
comradeship, group membership and a liking for the military
environment also contributed significantly to the decision
to join and remain in the Reserve.
B. A REVIEW OF MILITARY SUPPLY MODELS
Inception of the AVE concept for manning the US military
in 1972 introduced a need for careful modelling of the
supply of potential military enlistees. The impact of
policy measures on supply levels must be understood if
manning goals in the Active and Reserve forces are to be met
efficiently. Since the mid-70' s there have been numerous
studies done on Active force supply. A recent review listed
23 such studies covering enlistments in all the services and
DoD as a whole. [ Borack et al,1985: p. 5] . Far less attention
has been given to Reserve supply.
There is one problem which continually re-occurs in
studies of military supply. Almost all studies use
regression analysis to model supply levels. Because of data
constraints the dependent variable used is a measure of
enlistment contracts signed or accessions. The problem is
that the variable which is being modelled, potential
military supply, is not always the same as the number of
recruits enlisted. This is because the services set quotas
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on enlistment levels. These quotas vary between services.
Also, within services, different quotas apply for different
categories of recriuts. This means that the variable
researchers are measuring, supply, is actually a function of
both potential supply and the enlistment quota. The
implication is that results of studies which use demand
constrained data do not accurately reflect the underlying
relationships between the economic environment and potential
supply. Methods which have been used to overcome this
problem are discussed in more detail below.
1. Active Force Supply Studies
The large number of recent Active force studies
precludes a review of all of them. Instead three of the more
significant efforts are reviewed in detail below.
Goldberg , 1982 . This was a comprehensive study
which developed an econometric supply model for all services
using pooled time series, cross section recruiting data from
1975 to 1980. The model was developed using log linear OLS
regression. The dependent variable in the model was the
number of male NFS high school graduates (HSG). The model
was estimated separately for all HSG and those in mental
categories I-IIIA. The independent variables in the model'
were:
• relative military / civilian pay,
• civilian unemployment,
• military education benefits,
23
• expenditures on Federal youth employment programs,
• population of 17-21 year old males,
• race,
• number of recruiters by service,
• Navy advertising budget (other services data was
unavailable)
.
Goldberg handled the problem of demand constraints
by focusing his analysis on the results pertaining to the
male high quality sample ( ie mental category I-IIIA HSG).
This is a standard procedure in supply modelling. He
claimed that this group is rarely demand constrained and
therefore his model should produce accurate results.
[Goldberg, 1982: p. 16]
.
For DoD recruits as a whole in the above sample
Goldberg calculated supply elasticities of 1. 31 for relative
pay and . 13 for civilian unemployment. Both of these results
were statistically significant. [ Goldberg, 1982: p35]
.
Because of multicollinearity problems the effect of
recruiters is hard to distinguish in the model. He
concluded, however, that as well as own-service recruiters
having a positive effect, the cross effects of other
services recruiters on enlistment supply are also positive
and significant. He estimated the average recruiter
elasticity for DoD as .52. [ Goldberg, 1982: p. 37]
.
Paula and Smith . 1984 . This study rejects
Goldberg's contention that using high quality enlistee
24
samples removes the problem of demand constraint
contamination in study results. They contend that even high
quality groups may be demand constrained in certain
geographic areas. To overcome this problem they partition
their data into two samples. One sample is data from areas
where recruiting goals are met (i.e. supply constrained).
The other sample is all the demand constrained data. The
total sample consists of time series, cross section data
from 54 Army recruiting districts by month from October 1980
to June 1983. [ Daula and Smith, 1984: p. 6] .
Using only supply constrained data they estimate a
model to predict the number of high quality male Army
enlistment contracts. They include the following independent
variables in a log-linear OLS regression:







enlistment goals for all services and low quality Army
enlistments
number of Army recruiters and their experience,
levels of national and regional advertising.
[Daula and Smith, 1984: p. 8]
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To estimate the demand constrained model they use
the following specification:
In P = Y In Q + ( 1-Y) In S + e ( eqn 2.1)
• P = number of male high quality contracts
• Q = high quality goal
• £ = expected value of enlistment supply (based on the
supply constrained model)
• y = weighting factor relating the goal and expected
supply
The implication of this specification is that the
imposition of a goal does not completely restrict supply but
it does influence it. Observed supply is then modelled as a
weighted average of potential supply and the enlistment
goal. The greater the influence of the goal the closer the
value of Y is to 1.0. If the goal is absolutely enforced Y
equals 1.0. [Daula and Smith, 1984: p. 13]
.
The supply constrained model yielded statistically
significant elasticities of 1. 89 for relative pay and 1. 36
for unemployment. The recruiter elasticity was 1. 11 but the
authors suspected an upward bias in this figure due to
serial correlation resulting from the time series data and
the model's specification. Also they found a high positive
effect on enlistment due to post service education benefits.
[Daula and Smith, 1984: pp. 20-23]
26
The demand constrained model produced relatively
lower elasticities of . 824 for relative pay and . 995 for
unemployment. As expected the impact of the goal on
enlistments was very significant. [ Daula and Smith, 1984:
p. 25]
.
One important result from this study came from
estimating the supply function using only supply constrained
data but including the high quality enlistment goal as an
independent variable. The resulting coefficient of the goal
variable was not significantly different from zero
indicating that recruiter's goals have no effect on
enlistments in supply constrained districts. [Daula and
Smith, 1984: p. 20] . This result supports the validity of
Daula and Smith's data partitioning methodology.
Dertouzos , 1985 . This study analyses the effect of
recruitment quotas on recruiter behavior in detail as well
as developing an enlistment supply model. The study is based
on Army cross section recruiting data from 1980 and 1981.
Army recruiters are usually given two goals; one for high
quality males and a total goal which is the sum of high and
low quality recruits. Dertouzos points out that the
incentives provided on the basis of these goals may not be
consistent with the overall recruiting objective.
Historically recruiters have been rewarded for
meeting their enlistment goals but not for exceeding them.
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Also goals are set annually on the basis of previous years'
enlistments. Based on the reward system the most sensible
behavior for the recruiter is to meet his high quality goal,
recruit only low quality to meet his total goal and then
stop recruiting. This implies that after a certain point
recruiters may begin to trade off potential high quality
recruits in favor of lower quality- so as not to exceed their
goals. Dertouzos develops his supply model to test this
hypothesis. [ Dertouzos, 1985: pp. 1-lOJ
.
The model is developed using two log linear OLS
regression equations which are determined simultaneously.
The dependent variables are the number of high and low
quality recruits. The independent variables are:
• high quality quota,
• low quality quota,
• unemployment
• civilian wages,
• number of recruiters
• 15-19 year old male poulation,
• number of low quality recruits ( only with the high
quality dependent variable).
[Dertouzos, 1985: p. 14]
.
The inclusion of the number of low quality recruits
as an explanatory variable in the high quality specification
allowed calculation of a tradeoff parameter between the two
categories. This parameter is calculated for both data
28
samples and it reveals a consistent tradeoff figure of about
four low quality recruits to one high quality recruit. This
implies that a recruiting area by reallocating effort could
attract one more high quality enlistment for every low
quality enlistment it gives up. [ Dertouzos, 1985: p. 19]
.
Other results from the study were estimates of -1. 02
for civilian wage elasticity, . 754 for unemployment
elasticity and 1. 19 for recruiter elasticity.
[ Dertouzos, 1985: p. 16] .
The results of this study support the contention
that demand considerations, in the form of recruitment
goals, impact significantly on observed enlistment supply in
all categories. This strongly suggests that using the
assumption that male high quality recruits are never demand
constrained is an inappropriate methodology for modelling
enlistment supply.
2. Reserve Force Supply Studies
The results of active force supply studies are not
directly applicable to the Reserves for two reasons. First,
the majority of reservists have a full time civilian job and
participation in the Reserve is a moonlighting decision. The
model described earlier revealed a number of distinctions
between the motivations for seeking primary and secondary
labor market employment. Second, the Active force recruits
and operates in a national labor market. The Reserves,
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particularly the Army components, are forced to operate in
local labor markets. Across the U. S. the economic and
demographic factors that affect enlistments vary
considerably between local areas.
This restriction to consideration at the local labor
market level does not negate the importance of demand
constraint in the Reserve supply modelling process. It is
still plausible that in local areas potential supply may
exceed recruiting quotas. A further complication is that the
impact of quotas will be different across local labor
markets because of the differences in the magnitudes of
factors affecting potential supply.
There have been very few studies on Reserve
enlistment supply done since the introduction of the AVF.
The major ones are discussed below.
Rostker . 1974 . This was part of a large study
undertaken by the Rand corporation to investigate the impact
of the AVF on the Air Force Reserve. Part of this study was
the development of the moonlighting model discussed earlier.
The study develops an econometric model of enlistment supply
which is estimated using OLS regression. The dependent
variable is the number of enlistment applications recorded
(by age group, state and time period), divided by the
appropriate eligible population. Independent variables in
the model are:
• present value of a six year stream of Reserve income,
30
• present value of a six year stream of civilian income,
• population,
• age and region dummies.
This is not a very sophisticated model
specification. Because of the time period of the study and
the disaggregation to State level, the results obtained are
not pertinent to this study.
Kelly . 1979 . Kelly estimated supply models for both
NPS and PS personnel using total DoD accessions as his
dependent variable and relative pay, unemployment and
population as independent variables. This analysis is
disaggregated only to the State level and derived relative
wage elasticities of . 35 for PS supply and . 10 for NPS
supply. [ Kelly, 1979] .
Mcnauaht . June and July 1981 . In these two studies
McNaught reviews the work of Rostker and Kelly and points
out a number of limitations and inconsistencies in their
results. Combining those studies and the moonlighting model
McNaught develops a theoretical model of Reserve supply.
R = f(W, C, S, H, U, P, I, T, X) (eqn 2.2)
R = measure of Reserve participation
W = Reserve wage
C = civilian primary wage
S = civilian secondary wage
H = hours worked on primary job
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U = unemployment rate
P = population of eligible enlistees
I = stock of available information about the Reserve
T = travel costs
X = vector of seasonal, regional and time dummies
[McNaught, July 1985: p. 12]
.
Because of data restrictions the model which
McNaught estimates is much more restrictive than his
theoretical model. Specifically , he disaggregates his data
to the State level and includes no measure of travel cost.
Reserve opportunity information, or recruiting goals. In his
estimation McNaught concentrates on NFS enlistments and he
looks at total DoD accessions without dissaggregating by
component. He estimates his model using logit analysis with
the ratio of number of NFS accessions to qualified
population as the dependent variable. This specification
attempts to predict the probability of an individual with a
given set of characteristics enlisting in the Reserves.
[ McNaught , June 1981: p. 36]
The studies' results are not very useful because
State level estimation is a poor measure of local labor
market effects. He calculates an unemployment elasticity of
.81 [ McNaught, June 1981: p. 11] , and a pay elasticity of .15
[McNaught, July 1981: p. 38] . Borack, et. al. [1985] list four
criticisms of McNaught' s study:
• level of aggregation was too high,
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• lack of measure of regional military interest,
• no consideration of the interaction between Reserve and
Active recruiting systems,
• no consideration of the effect of local recruiting
goals (demand) on enlistment supply by geographic area.
[ Borack et al,1985: p. 11]
.
The Reserve supply studies reviewed above are
inconsistent and of limited use in estimating the effect of
policy and demographic changes on potential supply. To
improve the models the following considerations should be
incorporated:
• Data should be analysed at the lowest level of
geographic disaggregation possible.
• The impact of recruitment goals and quotas should be
included.
• Accessions should be modelled by individual Reserve
component.
• Cross effects of own and other Service, Active and
Reserve recruiters should be included.
C. CONCLUSIONS
Theoretical analysis of the Reserve participation
decision and a review of previous military supply studies
suggest that a useful model of Reserve supply should explain
the number of Reserve component accessions as a function of
the following explanatory variables:
Economic .




civilian primary job wages,
hours worked on the primary job,
civilian secondary job wages,
local area unemployment rates.
Demographic .





distances to Reserve centres.
Recruitment Policies .
number of recruiters by component (Active/Reserve),
recruitment goals,
measure of local military interest,
advertising effort.
Naturally resrictions on available data and model
specification may prevent some of these variables being
included in an estimated model.
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. DATA SOURCES
Data for this thesis has been drawn from two major
sources. The Reserve Components Common Personnel Data System
(RCCPDS) which is maintained by the Defense Manpower Data
Center was the source of data for Reserve accessions. A
subset of all Reserve accessions for FY 83-85 inclusive was
drawn from this file. The file contains personal and
military employment history information on all Reserve
accessions. [Department of Defense Instruction 7730.54^
1981]
.
Demographic and socio-economic data was drawn from the
DORIS database maintained by the Defense Manpower Data
Center. The data subset which was used contains
socio-economic and demographic data disaggregated to the zip
code level. The data used was gathered in the 1980 Census.
B. METHODOLOGY
1. Data Aggreaation
The focus of this thesis was an investigation of the
effect of local labor market conditions on Reserve supply.
These effects are likely to be most significant on Army
Reserve supply because these units are the most dependent of
all components on local recruiting. Therefore this analysis
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concentrated on a subset of data representing all accessions
to the Army Selected Reserve only, in FY 83-85. This
resulted in a pooled time series, cross section sample of
189,698 accessions in the period.
This sample was then further disaggregated into NPS
and PS subsets. This was done because, as was discussed in
the previous chapter, the factors affecting the Reserve
participation decision of these two categories are quite
different. One of the major variables explaining the level
of PS accessions in a local labor market will of course be
the pool of eligible PS personnel in that market. Because
that data was not available for analysis in this thesis no
models were developed for PS supply.
Additionally, no data was available on recruiting
assets, goals or advertising at the local labor market
level. The absence of this data precluded an analysis
similar to that done by Daula and Smith [ 1984] and Dertouzos
[ 1985] in which advanced modelling techniques were used to
include these variables in supply models in an attempt to
overcome the problem of demand constraint of the dependent
variable.
These data restrictions constrained the modelling
process in two ways. First, models could only be developed
for NPS accessions. Second, in order to minimize the
possible bias introduced by a demand constraint on the
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dependent variable, it was necessary to develop the model
using high quality accessions only. This group is the least
likely to be demand constrained. This is consistent with the
methodology used by Goldberg [ 1982]
.
Thus the accessions data was subsetted into high
quality NFS males and females. These final groups had the
following characteristics:
• No prior service in any Active or Reserve military
component.
• High school graduate or above education level.
• Classified into Mental Group 1-3 on the basis of AFQT
or Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB)
score.
• 17-29 years old.
Once these final NFS samples were identified it was
necessary to group the accessions into local labor market
areas. The first step in achieving this was to accumulate
aggregate counts of accessions by zip code of the home
address of the recruit. These zip code counts were then
aggregated upwards into counts by local labor market area
using a special purpose program based on an algorithm
supplied by USAREC. A local labor market was defined as an
area encompassing all zip codes whose geographic center fell
within a fifty mile radius of the geographic center of the
zip code of an Army Reserve center. There were 994 such
local labor markets defined across the U. S.
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These local labor market accession counts were then
merged with similarly aggregated demographic and
socio-economic data from the DORIS database. This gave a
final file which contained 994 records, each representing
the local labor market of an Army Reserve center and each
containing counts of all NPS male and female high quality
accessions for FY 83-85 and the corresponding 1980 economic
data. Data summaries of that file are shown in Table 4 and
the variables are defined in more detail in Appendix A.
The wide disparity in demographic and economic
characteristics across markets is explained by the fact that
the markets are defined geographically by distance. A fifty
mile radius around a Reserve center in Chicago is obviously
significantly different from one around a center in the
rural mid-west.
2. Model Specification
To investigate differences in Reserve supply
behavior across local labor markets four different model
specifications were estimated. These were:
• Standard linear models with male and female accession
counts as the dependent variables.
• Multiplicative models ( estimated using a log linear
transformation) with male and female accession counts
as the dependent variables.
• Standard linear models with male and female accession
rates as the dependent variables.
• Multiplicative models ( estimated using a log linear




LABOR MARKET SUMMARY DATA
Variable Mean St Dev Minimum Maximum
NFS Male^ 284 353 1897
NFS Female^ .... 123 163 806
QMA Male2 200470 288835 1026 1588767
QMA Female^ .... 208269 303930 801 1703465
% of Fopulation
Black 8.4 11.1 58.0
% of White Males
Unemployed 6.4 2.9 0.9 19.8
% of Black Males
Unemployed 4. 6 3.0 15. 5
% of White Females
Unemployed 6.5 2.1 1.2 17.7
% of Black Females
Unemployed 4.6 3.7 18.5
Av Family Income. 18431 3589 10202 29685
Av Family Size .. 3.4 0.2 2.9 4.6
Median Home
Value 46345 18237 20241 138460
Median Home Rent. 215 49 91 362
% of Families with
Dual Workers .... 53.0 5.8 29.0 64.0
% Fopulation Change
1970-1980 13.2 13.3 -7.0 96.0
% of Workers by Industry
Manufacturing . . . 30. 3 8. 2 9.0 51.
Service 47.3 6.0 34.0 68.0
Government 4.8 2.3 2.0 19.0
Seasonal 17.4 8.4 5.0 52.0
Note: 1. These are cumulative counts of all accessions
in the category during FY 83-85.
2. Qualified Military Available, ie population
aged 17-29 years.
These functional forms are discussed in more detail
below.
Standard ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple
regression models of the form in equation 3. 1 were estimated
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using NFS male and female counts as the dependent variables
and the economic variables in Table 4 as the independent
variables. This functional form was chosen because it is
the simplest specification which could be used to estimate
the market potential for any specific local market area.
Relevant male or female QMA and unemployment variables only
were included. The variable '% Change in Population' was
specified as a dummy variable with a value of 1 being
assigned if the change was positive and otherwise.
Because the variables representing industrial sectors are
percentages, their values will sum to 1. in every market
area. This leads to problems of multicollinearity which
would bias the regression coefficients obtained. [ Pindyck
and Rubinfeld, 1981: p. 88] . To overcome this the variable
'service' is omitted when all the models are estimated.
n
Y=a+2]t>L^L"^®L (®^^^ 3.1)
The multiplicative functional form assumes a
relationship of the type in equation 3.2.
Y = A"|TXi_'''\e;, (eqn 3.2)
us I
This form was chosen because it has been the most
commonly used in military supply modelling. For example it
was used by Goldberg [ 1982] and Daula and Smith [ 1984] . This
functional form assumes constant elasticities throughout the
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model. The model is actually estimated using a log linear
transformation of the form of equation. 3. 3 and the
regression parameters obtained are in fact estimates of the
supply elasticities of the variables. [ Pindyck and
Rubinfeld, 1981: p. 109] . Because the logarithm of is
undefined the dummy variable for population change and any
observation in which a variable had a value of were
omitted in this specification. •
n
In Y = In a + 2J^L( In XJ + e ;^ ( eqn 3. 3)
In these two specifications it was anticipated that
the QMA variable would significantly drive the explanatory
power of the model. This was confirmed using stepwise
regression techniques which showed that of the total
variation in the dependent variable explained by the whole
model approximately 95% was explained by the QMA variable
alone.
To observe the effect of removing this influence
from the model the third OLS specification was estimated in
which the dependent variable was the ratio of the NFS
accession count to the QMA base in the market (i.e. the
accession rate). This model was estimated for both males
and females. To overcome the estimation difficulties of
having a dependent variable clustered close to zero the
ratio was multiplied by 10,000. QMA was not included as an
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independent variable. Thus the parameter estimates in this
model measure the impact of the explanatory variables on the
proportion of the eligible population who decided to join
the Army Reserve.
The final model specification estimated was the
multiplicative form of the previous model. Again this was
estimated using a log linear transformation. Thus the
dependent variable was. log ((NPSM x 10,000) / QMAM}. This
model was also estimated for female accessions. In both
cases the independent variables were the logarithms of the
appropriate economic variables in Table 4. QMA and
population change were not included as independent variables
in this model.
The empirical results obtained from estimating these
models are discussed in the next chapter.
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IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
As described in the previous chapter, four model
specifications were estimated in this analysis. Because
their results are direct estimates of elasticities, only the
estimates from the two logarithmic transformation
specifications will be discussed in detail. The results of
those models are contained in tables in this chapter.
Results of the other specifications are listed in the
appendices of this thesis.
A. DIRECT ACCESSION COUNT MODEL
Results obtained from estimating the log linear
transformed model of the NFS male accession count are
"obtained in Table 5. Because this is a log linear model the
coefficients obtained are estimates of the partial supply
elasticities of the variables.
The most striking thing about this model is the very
large R^ value of . 88. This is mainly due to the inclusion
of the QMA variable. Its contribution alone, estimated using
stepwise regression techniques, is . 81. Although the
relative explanatory power of the remaining variables is
low, the coefficients for most of them are significantly
different from zero, thus their impact on accessions cannot
be discounted. The implications of the model's results are
discussed in detail below.
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TABLE 5
NPS MALE ACCESSION MODEL
Dependent Variable - log (NPS male accession count in
each local labor market}
N = 802^
Explanatory Variables Coefficient t
(natural log) Statistic
QMA Male 1. 04 * 32. 6
% of Population Black- -0. 14 * -6.
% of White Males Unemployed .... -0.07 -1.2
% of Black Males Unemployed .... -0. 10 * -2.5
Average Family Income 2. 22 * 9.7
Average Family Size 1. 75 * 4. 9
Median Home Value . -0. 43 * -3.9
Median Home Rent -1. 72 * -6. 1
% of Families with Dual Workers -0.61 * -2.8
% Population Change 1970-1980 .
.
Not Included
% of Workers by Industry
Manufacturing o. 27 * 2.0
Government 0. 29 * 5.8
Seasonal 0. 02 0.3
Intercept term -16. 35 * -9. 9
R2 = . 88
Note: 1. Some observations were excluded because they
contained values of zero for some variables.
* - coefficient was different from zero at 5%
level of significance.
QMA Male . The positive value of this elasticity is not
surprising but it should be noted also that the magnitude is
slightly greater than one. This implies slightly increasing
scale effects as the QMA base of a local labor market
expands. This result contrasts with the findings of
Goldberg [ 1982] . In his study of Active force supply he
found population elasticities considerably less than 1.
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although he had difficulty disentangling the combined
effects of recruiters and population. [ Goldberg^ 1982: p. 44]
.
% of Population Black . This elasticity is quite small
but the negative sign is unexpected in the sense that
generally the military attracts disproportionate quantities
of black recruits, particularly in the Active forces. One
possible explanation for the sign may be that as the
proportion of blacks in the population grows, holding QMA
constant, fewer of the total eligible population opt for
Reserve service simply because relatively more are joining
the Active forces or looking for a satisfactory primary job.
The coefficient does imply that areas with high
concentrations of blacks may not be good Reserve recruiting
grounds.
Unemployment Levels . Both unemployment coefficients are
negative and very small in magnitude. This contrasts with
the unemployment elasticity of . 81 obtained by McNaught in
his study although he was modelling total DoD accessions.
[ McNaught , June 1981: p. 11] . Certainly a positive sign would
be expected for these coefficients because the initial
Reserve active duty commitment should be attractive to
unemployed workers. The only mitigating factor would be a
feeling that Reserve participation would hinder seeking or
obtaining primary employment. It should also be noted that
these data are unemployment rates across the entire work
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force, not just 17-29 year olds. Also there may have been
significant changes in the rates between 1980 when the
unemployment rate was estimated and the FY 83-85 accession
period. This would only create biases however, if the
unemployment rates of the local labor markets changed
relative to each other over this period. Otherwise, since
this is essentially a cross sectional analysis, as long as
relative unemployment rates were constant, the effect on
accessions would not change.
Family Income . The high positive value of this
elasticity conflicts with the economic theory of
moonlighting. As family income rises the propensity to
undertake secondary work, including the Reserves, should
fall. One thing that should be noted is that this variable
is not a proxy for wage rates, which in terms of this model
would be constant across all market areas. Also the level of
family income may not be a significant influence on the
decisions of young adult family members still living with
their parents to join the Reserve.
This result also gives credence to the suggestion
discussed in Chapter 2, that participation in the Reserve
may have significant non economic dimensions. That is, as
income levels increase, younger people may be more disposed
to join the Reserve for the esprit de corps and social
contact it offers as opposed to opting for alternative
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secondary jobs which may pay more but be less attractive
overall.
Another consideration here is that this variable
measures total family income, not just imcome from primary
jobs. Thus as secondary labor market participation,
including Reserve participation, increases so will total
income levels. This relationship would imply a positive sign
on this coefficient.
Family Size . The significant positive relationship
between Reserve accessions and family size in the model is
consistent with the findings of Shishko and Rostker in their
analysis of multiple job holding. They explained the
positive relationship between moonlighting hours and family
size by claiming that family size was a proxy for
consumption. Thus the heads of large families would seek
secondary jobs in order to increase the family income.
[Shishko and Rostker, 1976: p. 307]
.
The large value of the elasticity for solely Reserve
participation is somewhat suspicious in terms of this
explanation, however. Because of the fixed and relatively
small number of hours that a Reservist works in a typical
month, the Reserves should be less attractive than
alternative forms of secondary employment to a man who is
seeking secondary employment to feed and clothe his family.
Also, as family size increases the costs of family
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separation during periods of mandatory active service would
probably increase.
Housing Costs . The significant negative coefficient on
the two variables representing housing costs are difficult
to explain. In their research on moonlighting behavior,
Shishko and Rostker found a positive relationship between
housing costs and moonlighting hours worked. [ Rostker and
Shishko, 1974: p. 16] . This is consistent with the economic
theory which suggests that as family consumption (of which
housing is a major part) rises the propensity of family
members to moonlight rises. While difficult to explain the
negative coefficients do suggest that as the relative
affluence of a community rises the likelihood of its members
joining the Reserve diminishes.
Dual Workers . The negative sign of this elasticity is
exactly what would be expected. As Borack et. al. note:
All other things equal, when a spouse enters the labor
market, the potential Reservist perceives a higher
family income and an increase in his household
productivity. Consequently, he is less likely to take a
second job. [Borack et al,1985: p. 19]
.
Population Change . Because this is a dummy variable it
could not be included in this log linear specification. The
coefficient of this variable in the standard OLS NFS male
model (Appendix B) was -103 and it was significantly
different from zero. Because a value of one was assigned to
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growing markets this coefficient implies that areas in which
the population is declining will produce relatively more
Reservists.
This is difficult to accept at face value and further
research into the demographics of the population change,
particularly in terms of age profiles and migration
patterns, would be necessary before the correct implications
of this result could be determined.
Industrial Mix . The surprising result here is the
relatively similar elasticities for government and seasonal
workers compared to manufacturing workers. One of the
obstacles to Reserve participation is securing time off from
a primary job to attend Reserve activities, despite the
commitment of many employers to support the Reserve. It
would be expected that these difficulties would accrue less
to government and seasonal workers than others. For reasons
discussed in Chapter 3, the service sector variable was
deleted from the estimated model. Thus its impact is
indirectly contained in the intercept term.
B. ACCESSION PROPORTION MODEL
The results of this model are contained in Table 6. The
dependent variable in this model is the ratio of the number
of accessions in a local labor market to the base of number
of qualified military available in the population of the
market. The ratio is multiplied by 10,000 to avoid
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statistical problems which occur in the OLS estimation
procedure when values of the dependent variable are













Not includedQMA Male . .
% of Population Black
% of White Males Unemployed . . . .




Median Home Rent .
% of Families with Dual Workers
% Population Change 1970-1980 . .





R2 = . 36
Note: 1. Some observations were excluded because they
contained values of zero for some variables.
* - coefficient was different from zero at 5%
level of significance.
The exclusion of QMA as an independent variable drops
thf; explanatory power of the model significantly. The
0. 14 * -5.
0.07 -1.2
0. 10 * -2. 4
2.32 * 10. 9
1. 80 * 5.
0.41 * -3.8
1. 73 * -6. 1
0.67 * -3.2
Not Inc luded
0.28 * 2. 1
0. 29 * 5.8
0. 01 -0. 1
8.08 * -5. 7
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resulting R^ of . 36 is, however, relatively large and again
the majority of coefficients are significantly different
from zero. Thus the model is useful in describing the
characteristics of potentially high yield Reserve markets.
There is virtually no difference in the coefficients
obtained between this model and the previous one. The signs
all remain the same and the magnitudes vary only marginally.
Although this does not add to the understanding of the
Reserve participation decision the result is still useful to
some extent. These results show that the characteristics of
potentially good Reserve recruiting areas remain unchanged
whether we measure that potential as a simple count or as a
ratio which represents the propensity of eligible
individuals in a market to enlist in the Reserve. This
consistency reinforces the conclusions drawn in the previous
section from the empirical results which have been obtained.
C. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Despite the relatively high explanatory power of the
models estimated in this analysis the estimates are of
little use in direct policy formulation. This is because the
variables used do not include any supply policy instruments.
The major significance of the results is the support
they provide to the central hypothesis of this study: that
the factors affecting Reserve supply differ across local
labor markets and are dependent upon the characteristics of
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those markets. This implies that future research to develop
an understanding of the Reserve participation decision
should disaggregate the analysis to at least the local labor
market level.
Another contribution of the results is that they define,
to some extent, the characteristics of a local labor market
which is likely to provide viable results for Reserve
recruiting effort. This type of information is potentially
useful when questions of unit location are considered.
Based on the results listed in this chapter and the
appendices a high yield Reserve market would have the
following characteristics:
high proportion of qualified military available in the
population.
relatively low proportion of blacks.
relatively high levels of income and general affluence.
relatively large average family size.
low proportion of families with dual workers.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH .
A. CONCLUSIONS
Consideration of the economic model of moonlighting,
particularly in its application to the Reserve participation
decision, suggested that differences in the factors
affecting Reserve supply would exist across local labor
markets. The results obtained in this analysis support that
hypothesis. Due to the restricted economic data available
for analysis at the local market level however the model
provides little effective assistance for Reserve manpower
supply policy formulation.
The major strength of the models developed here would be
in identifying characteristics of local markets which could
be expected to provide a high yield for Reserve units
located there. In that sense this is a useful first step in
developing a comprehensive Reserve supply model.
Certainly the results of this study strongly suggest
that in future efforts to develop Reserve supply models the
analysis should be disaggregated to at least the local labor
market level if meaningful policy direction is to be
obtained. It should also be noted that the local level is
the management decision making level for the Army Reserve.
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B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This analysis has concentrated on the relationship
between NFS, high quality Army Reserve accessions and the
economic characteristics of local labor markets. While the
level of disaggregation is probably correct the scope of the
analysis must be widened considerably to develop a
comprehensive Reserve supply model. Major dimensions of
Reserve supply which should be added to this analysis are
discussed below.
PS Accessions . As shown in Chapter 1 these represent a
large proportion of total Reserve accessions. To effectively
model this area of Reserve supply data would need to be
gathered on the size of eligible veteran pools in local
labor markets. There is also a need to distinguish in the
modelling process between those PS personnel who are
recruited into the Reserve by in-service recruiters ( ISR)
before they actually leave the Active force and those who
join the Reserve after some time out of the Active force.
Obviously local labor market conditions would have little
effect on the decisions of the former category of recruits
whilst their effect on the latter could be significant.
Other Reserve Components . A natural extension of the
analysis would include modelling the supply of the Army
National Guard and Navy and Air Force Reserve components. It
is possible that because of their operational
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characteristics the Air Force and Navy components will not
be as dependent on the local labor market for recruits as
the Army components. If this is so some redefinition of the
appropriate market may be required.
Recruiting Effort . The work of Daula and Smith [ 1984]
and Dertouzos [ 1985] clearly indicated the impact which
recruiting resources and goals have on military supply
levels. A major development of this analysis would be to use
techniques similar to those employed by these researchers to
estimate the impact of recruiting resources ( ie number of
recruiters and advertising expenditures) and goals at the
local market level. Alternatively, this could be
accomplished by examining the fill rates (ratios of assigned
to authorized levels) of Reserve units and centers. This
would enable the analysis to be broadened from the high
quality recruit category by overcoming the problem of demand
constraint of the dependent variable.
In undertaking this type of analysis both the direct
impact of own- service recruiters and the cross effects of
other service recruiters should be estimated. The objective
of the analysis would be to determine the correct local mix
of Active and Reserve recruiters of each component,
advertising exposure and recruiting goals which would meet
the manning objectives of all local Reserve units at least
total cost to DoD.
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Additional Explanatory Variables . The economic theory
discussed in Chapter 2 suggests that the following variables
would have an impact on the Reserve participation decision:
• Relative wages - Reserve wages, primary civilian wages
and secondary wages.
• Other pecuniary Reserve benefits such as medical and
education assistance.
• Hours worked on primary jobs.
• Average local education levels.
• Unemployment in the 17-29 year age group rather than
total unemployment levels.
The inclusion of these variables, if they could be
measured or estimated at the local market level, would
increase the usefulness of the model as a policy analysis
tool. The quality of the model would also be improved if the
data used was updated to current levels as opposed to the




NPS Male/Female . Cumulative counts of all NPS
accessions in the appropriate category during FY 83-85
inclusive. NPS implies no prior service in any Active or
Reserve component.
OMA Male/Female . Qualified military available. This is
a count of the male/female population in the market area
aged 17-29 years.
^ of Population Black . Total number of blacks divided
by the total population in each market in 1980. (All ages
and sexes).
Average Family Income . Average income accruing to all
families in the market area from all sources in 1980.
Average Family Size . Average number of family members
in 1980.
Median Home Value . Median value of all family homes in
the market area in 1980.
Median Home Rent . Median rent paid for all dwellings in
the market area in 1980.
°/. of Families with Dual Workers . Number of families
with two or more members holding full or part time jobs in
1980.
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% Population Change . Total population figures for each
market area. ((1980— 1970) / 1970} x 100.
Manufacturing Workers . Proportion of workers reported
in census classifications 'manufacturing', 'transport' and
'communications' in 1980 in each market area.
Service Workers . Proportion of workers reported in
census classifications 'wholesale', 'retail', 'finance',
'service', 'recreation', 'health', 'education', and 'other'
in 1980 in each market area.
Government Workers . Proportion or workers reported in
'government' census classification in 1980 in each market
area.
Seasonal Workers . Proportion of workers reported in
census classifications 'agriculture' and 'construction' in
1980 in each market area.
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APPENDIX B
ACCESSION COUNT MODELS RESULTS
Explanatory Variables
QMA^
% of Population Black'
% of White Males Unemployed . .
% of Black Males Unemployed . .
% of White Females Unemployed.





% of Families with Dual Workers
% Population Change 1970-1980





N = 802 ; R2
Dependent Variables
NPS Male NPS Female
Accession Accession
0. 001 * 0. 0004 *
223. 6 * 16. 7
-5. 42 -




0. 05 * 0. 03 k
209. 4 * 5. 75
0.003 *
-2. 9 * -1. 6 *
425. 4 * -51. 6
103.0 * -33. 3 *
644.2 * -31. 6
169. 5 1357 k
-1234 * -104.0
142. 3 -92. 4
. 88 90
Note: 1. Qualified military available of appropriate
sex.




ACCESSION PROPORTION MODELS RESULTS
Explanatory Variables Dependent Variables
NPS Male NPS Female
Ratio Ratio
% of Population Black
% of White Males Unemployed . .
% of Black Males Unemployed . .
% of White Females Unemployed..




Median Home Rent .
% of Families with Dual Workers
% Population Change 1970-1980





N = 802 ; ' R2 .29 . 24
Note: 1. Qualified military available of appropriate
sex.
* - coefficient was different from zero at
5% significance level.
-15. 9 * 1. 4
-0. 40 * -




0.001 * 0.001 *
12.25 * 1. 42
-0. 18 * -0.09 *
-24. 6 * 3. 12
-1. 89 * -0. 66 it
-16.8 * -16.7 k
-9.5 8. 3
-32.3 * -19.2 *
20. 3 * 14. 1 *
60
APPENDIX D




% of Population Black
% of White Females Unemployed.




Median Home Rent .
% of Families with Dual Workers





N = 802 ; R2
Dependent Variables
(natural logs)
NPS Female NPS Female
Accessions Ratio
1. 10 * -
-0. 04 -0. 03
-0. 03 -0. 05
-0.01 -0. 01
2. 11 * 2. 35 *
1. 12 * 1.32 *
-0. 19 -0. 14
-2. 05 * -2. 03 *
0. 07 -0. 14
0. 31 * 0. 36 *
0. 48 * 0. 48 *
0.21 * 0. 12
15.26 •k -8. 52 *
87 26
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